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ENFORCEABILITY OF
ANTE-NUPTIAL PROMISES
TO RAISE CHILDREN IN
A PARTICULAR RELIGION'
GORDON

A

A.

MARTIN, JR.*

which more and more courts have been called on
to consider of late is the legal enforceability of an ante-nuptial agreement between a couple to raise their children in a particular religion.,
This note deals primarily with the most frequent instance of such an
agreement, the promises exchanged by Roman Catholic and non-Catholic
"that all children of either sex born of this marriage shall be baptized
and educated solely in the Catholic religion."'
An understanding of the Catholic view of marriage is essential to a
thorough consideration of this problem. The marriage of baptized persons
is a sacrament 2 and "... is regulated by divine law and canon law alone,
without prejudice to the competence of the civil authority in regard to
the purely civil effects." '3 Many religions frown on mixed marriages. 4
VEXING PROBLEM

tThis article was originally published in 3 N.H.B.J. 18 (1960).
"Member of the Massachusetts Bar; A.B., Harvard; L.L.B., New York University.
1 Archdiocese of New York Application for Dispensation 2 (undated). Phrasing
varies from diocese to diocese, but the substance remains the same and is attested
to by both parties. Some dioceses add a clause that the agreement stands even
if the Catholic party ". . . should happen to be taken away by death." Brewer v.
Carey, 148 Mo. App. 193, 197, 127 S.W. 685, 686 (1910); see Dumais v. Dumais,
152 Me. 24, 25, 122 A.2d 322, 323 (1956).
2
Canon 1012. WOYWOD, THE NEW CANON LAW 205 (7th ed. 1929).
3 CICOGNANI, CANON LAW 121 (2d rev. ed. 1947).
4 "Intermarriage is not countenanced by modern Judaism ...

due . .. to a convic-

tion that unity of religion is essential to the happiness of the home." 5 JEWIsH
ENcyc. 626, quoted in Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100, 109 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
1942). Hehman v. Hehman, 13 Misc.2d 318, 319, 178 N.Y.S.2d 328, 330 (Sup.
Ct. 1958) notes 1956 resolutions of the Methodist and United Lutheran Churches
warning of the dangers of mixed marriage.
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The Roman Catholic Church "consents to
them reluctantly, and grants a dispensation
only for good reasons and provided that the
non-Catholic party agrees . . . that any
children of the marriage shall be brought
up as Catholics ..
.' While the marriage
of two baptized non-Catholics, performed
as they wish, is considered by the Catholic
Church to be fully as much a sacrament as
the marriage of two Catholics in their ceremony, a civil or non-Catholic ceremony for
a Catholic is considered a nullity, being no
more than the form of marriage. 6 Since the
Council of Trent decree of 1563, it has been
required, barring such exceptions as danger
of death or the unobtainability of a priest,
that a Catholic be married before the parish
priest and two other witnesses. 7 With the
ante-nuptial agreement in question a prerequisite to obtaining the dispensation, most
practicing Catholics would not attempt marriage without it. Judicial notice has been
taken of this fact," and this plus the Catholic's view of the indissolubility of the marriage bond,9 should even add to the already
accepted proposition that marriage is a valuable consideration sufficient for a promise. 10
5 SHEED,

NULLITY

OF

MARRIAGE

95

(new ed.

1959).
6 Ibid.
7

Id. at 88-94.

s "Adherence to the tenets of his religion are to
him of paramount importance; so too its precepts
which demand that his child be reared in his
faith. In the circumstances the inference may be
fairly drawn, indeed the conclusion, that in the
absence of such a promise by the wife, he would
not have married the, plaintiff." Ross. v. Ross,
4 Misc.2d 399, 403, 149 N.Y.S.2d 585, 589 (Sup.
Ct. 1956); accord, Shearer v. Shearer, 73
N.Y.S.2d 337, 358 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
9 Canon 1013 §2. BOUSCAREN AND ELLIS, CANON
LAW 399, 401-02 (0q46).
10

1

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 110

(3d ed. 1957).

While ante-nuptial agreements are as a
whole favored by law, 1' clearly no such
contract dealing in something as important
as a child's religious upbringing should be
enforced blindly and without careful consideration. Frequently side issues have obscured the basic issue to be dealt with here,
enforcement of the agreed religious training
by one of the two parties to the agreement.
One court found such an agreement void for
indefiniteness. 1 2- Another ruled against the
agreement in part because it felt tuition payments to the parochial school the child had
attended constituted monetary contribution
to the Church itself. 13 A third interpreted
the agreement as trying to govern award of
custody which was dealt with by statute in
that jurisdiction. 14 A recurring problem has
been the standing to sue of a relation or
next friend of the deceased Catholic spouse
trying to enforce the agreement against the
surviving non-Catholic parent.' 5 As such a
person would not have been a party to the
promises exchanged between the man and
woman, this difficulty is readily apparent.
The decisions near or on point in this
century have fallen into six main areas.
(1) The traditional English view of the
nineteenth century, well summarized in a
1916 law review note16 which has come to
11 Roush v. Hullinger, 119 Ind. App. 342, 346,
86 N.E.2d 714, 715 (1949); 4 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE §1297 (5th ed. 1941).
12 Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d
491 (1956).
13 Hackett v. Hackett, 146 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio C.P.
1957), afl'd, 150 N.E.2d 431 (Ohio Ct. App.
1958).
14 Stanton v. Stanton, 213 Ga. 545, 100 S.E.2d
289 (1957).
15 Brewer v. Carey, 148 Mo. App. 193, 127
S.W. 685 (1910); Commonwealth v. McClelland,
70 Pa. Super. 273 (1918) (dictum).
16 Friedman, The Parental Right to Control the
Religious Education of a Child, 29 HARv. L. REV.
485 (1916) and cases cited therein.

7
be a standard reference, emphasized the
paternal right of religious choice for his
children, the patria potestas. The theory
died slowly. Twentieth century courts might
concede that the belief was pass6, but they
17
still placed at least some reliance upon it.
One New York court stated unqualifiedly
as late as 1913 that "by the law of this state,
it is the father . . . who has the right to
determine the religious beliefs of an infant
under 14 years of age."' 8 Yet "most of the
states - even a state as important as New
York - [were] still without any decisions
9
on the subject from a court of last resort."'
Most states are still without such decisions,
but the highest courts of Georgia, 20 Kan23
and New York 24
sas, 21 Iowa, 22 Maine
have all recently spoken, and there have
been numerous lower court decisions. The
decisions have varied from holdings of rigid
enforceability in two New York lower
17 In re McConnon, 60 Misc. 22, 112 N.Y. Supp.
590 (Surr. Ct. 1908); In re Jacquet, 40 Misc. 575,
82 N.Y. Supp. 986 (Surr. Ct. 1903).
18 In re Lamb's Estate, 139 N.Y. Supp. 685, 689
(Surr. Ct. 1912). The court ordered the child
to be raised a Catholic in accord with the father's
wishes despite the fact that the father himself
had chosen to be married by a non-Catholic
minister.
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courts, 25 to findings of unconstitutionality in
Connecticut, 26 Ohio 27 and Iowa. 2s
(2) Ramon v. Ramon, 29 a 1942 opinion

by the Domestic Relations Court of New
York City, was first to uphold validity.
"An ante-nuptial agreement providing for
the Catholic faith and education of the children of the parties, in reliance upon which
a Catholic has thereby irrevocably changed
the status of the Catholic party, is an enforceable contract having a valid consideration." 30° Of note additionally is the court's
statement that as a "clearly established" 3'
rule of law ".... the fact that a child, in violation of the ante-nuptial contract, has for a
period of time been brought up in some
other religion than that fixed in the antenuptial agreement, is not sufficient ground
to deprive the respondent of his rights to
have the child educated in the religion [so]
fixed ....
,32 That enforcement beyond a
certain age could then be most harmful to
the child is not difficult to see, and a court
should indeed consider carefully before so
enforcing. While the child here, eight years
of age, had been removed from Catholic
parochial school and sent to Protestant
services and Sunday School for an unspeci-

19 Friedman, supra note 16, at 498.
20

Stanton v. Stanton, 213 Ga. 545, 100 S.E.2d

289 (1957).

25 Ross v. Ross, 4 Misc.2d 399, 149 N.Y.S.2d

Jackson v. Jackson, 181 Kan. 1, 309 P.2d 705
(1957). While this case dealt with a wife's loss
of custody of her child due to her being a
Jehovah's Witness, the court readopted its earlier
holding in Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193
Pac. 307 (1920) that following the death of one
party to the ante-nuptial agreement, the latter

585 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Ramon v. Ramon, 34
N.Y.S.2d 100 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1942).
26 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 Conn. Supp.
278, 132 A.2d 420 (Super. Ct. 1957).
27Hackett v. Hackett, 150 N.E.2d 431 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1958), affirming 146 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio
C.P. 1957). The Hackett case has been called
". .. the strongest authoritative stand to date

was ". . . merely persuasive.. ." upon the survivor.

against ...

Denton v. James, supra at 736, 193 Pac. at 311.
22 Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d
491 (1956).
23 Dumais v. Dumais, 152 Me. 24, 122 A.2d
322 (1956).
24 Martin v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E.2d
812 (1954) (per curiam).

284, 287' (1958).

21

enforceability.

12 VAND. L. REv.

28 Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d
491 (1956) (dictum).
29 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1942).
3Old. at 112.
31 Ibid.
32 Id. at 113.
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fled time, she had been placed in a Catholic
boarding school at the beginning of the
instant proceedings so that the point was
not truly at issue.
33
Recently a second New York court,
acting two years after the state's highest
court had employed a different test, 34 upheld the agreement, specifically decreeing
that [psychologically] the child should be
sent to a parochial school or else be permitted to take part in the released time
program at his public school.
(3) The test employed by the New York
Court of Appeals in 1954 ignored the antenuptial agreement and permitted a twelveyear-old boy to choose for himself.8 5 The
child in the instant case had been baptized
a Catholic in accord with the agreement but
had then been sent to Christian Science
Sunday School at an early age. In 1949 the
husband, the Catholic spouse, brought annulment proceedings on the basis of the
violated agreement. The wife prevailed in a
counterclaim for separation, but the judgment provided that the child be raised in the
Catholic religion. Later the wife sought
modification of the decree so that the son
might attend public school and receive
Christian Science training. Basing his decision on the child's wishes, the official
referee granted the modification sought. 36
The Appellate Division affirmed 3-2 without
opinion. 37 A brief dissenting memo doubted
whether a twelve-year-old had sufficient
33Ross v. Ross, 4 Misc.2d 399, 149 N.Y.S.2d
585 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
34 Martin v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E.2d
812 (per curiam), affirming 283 App. Div. 721,
127 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1st Dep't 1954).
35 Ibid.
36 For excerpts from the referee's report see 1
N.Y.L.F. 247 (1955).
37 Martin v. Martin, 283 App. Div. 721, 127
N.Y.S.2d 851 (1st Dep't 1954).

maturity to make such a decision and declared that the mother who had confused
him in violation of the agreement and judgment ". . . should be required to fulfill her
promise and the earlier direction of the
court. The tenets of all religions as well as
the law require the observance of a solemn
obligation." 3
A divided Court of Appeals similarly
affirmed, stating, per curiam, that there was
ample evidence that the boy was old enough
to testify intelligently and that modification
was in his best interests. 39 Desmond, J., now
chief judge of the court, writing for himself
and the then Chief Judge Conway, dissented
on four grounds: 4 0 first, that no harm to
the boy had been shown from his Catholic
religious training, and that the referee had
gone beyond his realm in relying entirely
upon the child's wishes; second, that reliance on the competency of a twelve-yearold is contrary to stare decisis, human
experience, and the parens patriae public
policy of the state as embodied in seventeen
statutes and a section of the state constitution; third, that this agreement was as enforceable as any other until harm was shown
to the child; and finally that equity could
not grant relief to the mother who had
created the boy's desires by violating the
agreement and the terms of the judgment.
The failure of the majority in the Martin
case to state whether it was declaring a general rule has left inconsistency in the state's
lower courts. In 1956 in the case noted
previously 4' the Supreme Court of Erie
381d. at 722, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 851 (dissenting
opinion).
39 Martin v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E.2d
812 (1954).
40
d. at 139-40, 123 N.E.2d at 812-13 (dissenting
opinion).
41 Ross v. Ross, 4 Misc.2d 399, 149 N.Y.S.2d
585 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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County enforced the agreement and also
awarded conditional custody to the Catholic
father despite the hostility of the child,
eight and a half years old, toward the father
and his past recent refusals to attend the
latter's church. Yet the Supreme Court* of
Queens County has twice been governed
in its determinations solely by the Court of
Appeals holding in Martin v. Martin,in both
42
instances the only case cited by the court.
Thus choice of religion was accorded to a
fifteen-year-old girl and a thirteen-year-old
boy. Concerning the latter child, the court
expressly stated that it would reach a contrary result did it not feel bound by the
Martin decision. 43 If the rule is to be that
any normal twelve or thirteen-year-old can
choose his religious future in New York,
then we ought also to note that a New York
court of an earlier day relied heavily on
the views of a ten-year-old in determining
his religious upbringing. 44 The ridiculous

granted custody to determine the.-child's
religious training. 45 A frequently cited Missouri case declares that the right to make
such a decision lies "at the foundation of the
right of custody itself,"'46 while a recent
New Jersey case speaks of the "right" of
the non-Catholic to whom custody had been
granted, to change not only her own religion
at will but also that of the children.

features of such an arbitrary selection of an

(5) Of the three courts which have dealt
directly with the problem of unconstitutionality, two, Connecticut 4s and Ohio, 49 have
found it violative of sections of their state
constitutions,50 while Iowa in a 5-4 decision

age for religious choice are apparent. We
see that eight and a half is too young but
that ten may be all right. Are We then to split
the difference and make nine and a quarter
our standard?
(4) Most cases turn on the issue of the
child's welfare, generally relying on the
principle of welfare in awarding custody of
the child and then permitting the one
Hehman v. Hehman, 13 Misc.2d 318, 178
N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Booke v. Booke,
207 Misc. 999, 141 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
t3Hehman v. Hehman, supra note 42, at 321,
178 N.Y.S.2d at 331. See also Comment, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 680 (1959), which notes the
ambiguity of the Martin holding and the inconsistency in the lower courts, and advocates that
New York confer with the award of custody the
right to determine the child's religious training.
44
In re McConnon, 60 Misc. 22, 112 N. Y. Supp.
590 (Surr. Ct. 1908).
42

To invoke the principle of estoppel against
the plaintiff because of her ante-nuptial
agreement . . . would be to disregard the

overriding consideration of what is best for
the children and to determine - arbitrarily

- their future welfare by an act with which
they had nothing to do. . .. [1]t would deprive the mother of her right to change her
mind - to choose a religion which appar-

ently gives her greater spiritual comfortand to inculcate in the children entrusted
to her custody the religious principles which,
for the time being, seem to her best.

(Emphasis added.)

47

45 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 Conn. Supp.

278, 132 A.2d 420 (Super. Ct. 1957); Lynch v.
Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d 491 (1956);
Dumais v. Dumais, 152 Me. 24, 122 A.2d 322
(1956); Brewer v. Carey, 148 Mo. App. 193,
127 S.W. 685 (1910); Stanton v. Stanton, 213
Ga. 545, 100 S.E.2d 289 (1957).
46Brewer v. Carey, supra note 45, at 215, 127
S.W. at 692.
47 Boerger v. Boerger, 20 N.J. Super. 90, 101, 97
A.2d 419, 425 (Super. Ct. 1953).
48 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 Conn. Supp.
278, 132 A.2d 420 (Super. Ct. 1957). But cf.
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 141 Conn. 235, 104 A.2d
898 (1954).
49 Hackett v. Hackett, 150 N.E.2d 431 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1958).
-0 The sections in question are set forth: "It

being the duty of all men to worship the Supreme
Being, the Great Creator and Preserver of the
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analogized the situation to the restrictive
covenant cases, Shelley v. Kraemer51 and
Hurd v. Hodge, 2 and stated that judicial
enforcement would violate the first amendment as applied to the states by the fourteenth.5 3 The dissent rejected this, drawing
an analogy of its own to the fact that adoption statutes prescribing that guardians of
the same faith as the child be appointed
"when practicable

' 54

had been held consti-

tutional.55

If religious affiliations may be considered
in relation to the custody of the children,
without offending Constitutional provisions,
there should be no legal objection to incorUniverse, and their right to render that worship,
in the mode most consistent with the dictates of
their consciences; no person shall by law be compelled to join or support, nor be classed with, or
associated to, any congregation, church or
religious association." CONN. CONST. art. VII, §1.
"All men have a natural and indefeasible right
to worship Almighty God according to the dictates
of their own conscience. No person shall be
compelled to attend, erect, or support any place
of worship, or maintain any place of worship,
against his consent; and no preference shall be
given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall
any interference with the rights of conscience be
permitted." OHIO CONST. art. I §7.
51334 U.S. 1 (1948).
52334

U.S. 24 (1948).

53 Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d

491 (1958) (dictum). This view was presaged
the preceding year in Pfeffer, Religion in the
Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L. REV. 333,

364 (1955), an exhaustive work which has
become the basic contemporary reference for the
anti-enforcement view. Mr. Pfeffer appeared as

amicus curiae for the petitioner in the Lynch case.
54 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, §5B (1958); N.Y.C.
DOM. REL. CT. ACT §88 (3) (1958). For a collec-

tion of the many similar state statutes see Note,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 376 (1954).
55 Petitions of Goldman,
331 Mass. 647, 121
N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942
(1955). But see Pfeffer, supra note 53, at 380.
Mr. Pfeffer served as counsel for the petitioner

in the Goldman case. See generally N. Y. Times,
Oct. 11, 1959, p. 1, col. 3.

porating in a divorce decree which awards
custody, a provision which both parents
have agreed upon and asked the court to
include in the decree awarding custody. 51G
(6) The final area and the course advocated by this writer has been adopted by
courts in New York and Pennsylvania. In
Shearer v. Shearer,57 a 1947 New York Supreme Court decision which has never been
overruled, the court declared:
I am firmly of the opinion that the
agreement relating to the religious training
of the children entered into by Beatrice
Shearer orally and in writing was an inducing cause of this marriage and is an enforceable contract which, in and of itself, should
be upheld.
But I am charged with a responsibility
even more impelling than the religious
rights of this father. The controlling consideration here is the welfare of the
children.5
The children here involved were three and
a half and a little over one. Custody was
awarded to the mother, but the Catholic
father was to be allowed to take each child
to church upon' his reaching the age of
four, and assuming no contrary agreement
was reached in the year thereafter, he
might apply for an order that the child be
enrolled in a parochial school.
A 1920 Pennsylvania case held in a
wholly different situation that non-Catholic
custody was not of necessity incompatible
with a Catholic education. 59 The parents of
the three children here involved, who were
,6Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 93, 78
N.W.2d 491, 506 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
57 73 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
58Id. at 358.
59 In re Butcher's Estate, 266 Pa. 479, 109 Atl.
683 (1920). This same attitude has been expressed
more recently in Commonwealth ex rel. Conrod
v. Conrod, 165 Pa. Super. 628, 70 A.2d 433
(1950).

7
six, thirteen and fifteen years of age respectively, were deceased. The court reaffirmed
as guardian the children's non-Catholic paternal grandfather. Noting that "the welfare
of the child must remain the primary consideration to which all other questions must
yield,"'0° the court nonetheless emphasized
the ". . . willingness of the guardian to
carry out the express wishes of the parents
61
with respect to religious training ....
A perfect instance of circumstances in
which enforcement was properly denied is
provided in another Pennsylvania case. 62
There two girls, aged twelve and thirteen,
had been baptized in accord with the antenuptial agreement, but when insanity confined their mother to an asylum, they were
raised for nine years by their non-Catholic
paternal grandmother, attending Protestant
services and Sunday School, and had developed readily apparent prejudices against
their mother's religion. At this belated point
a maternal aunt, attempting to act in the
stead of the now deceased mother, petitioned that the children be placed in a
Catholic home or institution that they might
be educated in that faith. The court in rejecting the petition declared:
There was no reason why in their early
infancy, when their minds could have been
more readily molded to the reception of the
religion of their mother, there should not
have been some action taken to this end.
It is not likely that the father would
have raised any objection, and, if he had,
his stipulation entered into at the time of
the marriage would have been a sufficient
answer.

63

60 In re Butcher's Estate, 266 Pa. 479, 485, 109

Atd. 683, 685 (1920).
61 Ibid.
62 Commonwealth v. McClelland, 70 Pa. Super.

273 (1918).
03

Id. at 276.
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We find in these cases a judicial awareness
that the welfare of the children involved
must ever remain the prime consideration,
but that a parent, having freely entered a
serious agreement, ought not to be allowed
to breach it without good and substantial
reason. This writer feels that only a showing
that enforcement will be contrary to the
child's welfare provides such a good and
substantial reason.
These six main patterns having been considered, three questions remain to be answered. Can equity properly act in this type
of agreement? Is it practicable for it to act?
And, assuming an affirmative answer to the
first two, should it act? Clearly the legal
remedy of damages is both impossible to
determine and utterly inadequate. If there
is to be a remedy, it must be specific performance. Yet traditionally equity limited
64
itself to the protection of property rights.
The equity concept has steadily broadened,
however. 65 Though lip service may still periodically be paid to the property concept,
equity today reaches anywhere from injunctions in the labor-management realm66 to
the protection of family relations.' 7 There
has been little objection on the grounds of
improper equity jurisdiction even among
those courts refusing to enforce the agreement. 8 Clearly equity can act and has acted
to protect the intangible and the personal
64 Note, Equity's Role in the Protection of Civil
Rights, 37 IOWA L. REv. 268, 270-72 (1952).
MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY §148 (2d ed. 1948).
65 37 IowA L. REV. supra note 64, at 274, and
the cases cited therein; MCCLINTOCK, op. cit.
supra note 64, §§148-62.
66 MCCLINTOCK, op. cit. supra note 64, § 155.
6T Id. § 162.
68 Of the recent decisions refusing to enforce
the agreement, only Dumais v. Dumais, 152
Me. 24, 122 A.2d 322 (1956), held it was not a
proper subject for equity jurisdiction.
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which are ". . . as real and as valuable as
any property right."'6 9
The question is raised: can such an agreement really be enforced apart from the
award of custody? Clearly no one can voice
a guarantee in any particular case. However, it is possible for it to work. The writer
feels first that the agreement and the likelihood of its being kept should be a consideration, though certainly not a decisive one,
in a court's award of custody. It cannot be
disputed that religious development is easier
when the parent or guardian is of the same
faith. Should the custody be awarded to the
non-Catholic, enforcement of the agreement
is still possible in a number of ways and
without subjecting the parent to any personal religious observance. If practicable,
the Catholic parent could personally take
the child to church and Sunday School. If
not, possibly the godparents will be available. 70 There may be a parochial school in
the immediate neighborhood or a released
time program in the public schools. Failing
all else, there will almost invariably be
some priest or layman at hand and willing
to assist, 71 or a special children's Mass each

That education outside the home can be
subverted within it is obvious. Possibly a
reappraisal of custody might be in order in
such a case. For equity, however, to refuse
to act for fear of disobedience to its decree
would be defeating its very raison d'tre.
Lastly - should such an agreement be
enforced? No thinking person today of any
faith wants "an establishment of religion"
or an intrusion on "the free exercise
thereof." But there is a vast difference between either of these constitutional prohibitions and judicial enforcement of promises
voluntarily exchanged by a man and woman prior to marriage.7 2 There is, of course,
no intrusion on the non-Catholic's right to
vary his own religious views at will, but
there should be no such right as to the children. Both parties have contracted that any
children be raised as Catholics. What is
sought is enforcement of this promise during
the period of the child's legal incompetency.
When of age he will have the same right of
73
choice that his parents have and have had.

There is ".

.

. no constitutional require-

ment which makes it necessary for govern(Continued on page 84)

Sunday at the church.
69 Ross v. Ross, 4 Misc.2d 399, 403, 149 N.Y.S.2d
585, 589 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
70 The godparents are selected by the child's
parents at the time of the Catholic baptism and
serve as his two sponsors. In accord with Canon
769 the sponsor or sponsors assume by that role
a responsibility for the spiritual welfare and the
religious upbringing of the child. WOYWOD, THE
NEW CANON LAW 157 (7th ed. 1929). See Comment, Rationale of Pre-Nuptial Agreements Providing for the Religious Training of Children,
34 U. DET. L. J. 632, 637, n. 27 (1957).
T1 "There are in excess of 30,000,000 members of
that faith in the United States, and in all parts
of the country there are many thousands of
churches, schools, hospitals, and other institutions
supported by its members; . . . She, no doubt,
could . . . have had someone take him where he

would receive instructions in the Church of his
baptism. The communicants of any religious
faith or denomination are eager to add another
to their number." Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248
Iowa 68, 89, 78 N.W.2d 491, 504 (1956)
(dissenting opinion).
T2 One New York court has enforced a postnuptial agreement that should the wife's action
to dissolve the marriage be successful, both parties
would appear before a Rabbinate to dissolve their
marriage according to the laws of their religion.
"Specific performance herein would merely
require the defendant to do what he voluntarily
agreed to do." Koeppel v. Koeppel, 138 N.Y.S.2d
366, 373 (Sup. Ct. 1954), referee's reversal on
other grounds a/f'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 853, 161
N.Y.S.2d 694 (2d Dep't 1957).
73 Sullivan v. Sullivan, 141 Conn. 235, 241, 104
A.2d 898, 901-02 (1954).
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A more practical approach might be the
abandonment of the phrase in question
altogether and the substitution of a detailed
list of the actual crimes necessary to effect
banishment. The requisite flexibility of such
an approach would, of course, be provided by subsequent legislative amendments

including or excluding crimes. This identical method has proved both feasible and
practical in other similar areas, notably
8
that of international extradition treaties.a

ANTE-NUPTIAL PROMISES

ought require that the othei party assume
the burden of showing that the agreed religious upbringing no longer would be in
the best interests of the child. Sound judicial
discretion can then evaluate this difficult
situation in which wholly doctrinaire approaches and artificial standards can but
prove inadequate.

(Continued)
ment to be hostile to religion and to throw
its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence. ' 74 Man
and woman have freely exchanged solemn
promises which by their very substance
demonstrate their seriousness. The state in
assuming its role as arbitor of domestic
controversy ought not lightly regard such
promises. When one parent seeks to enforce
the agreement, the writer feels the court

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
Concerning permissible monetary aids to religion
see U. S. CONST., amend. 1, 763-64 (Corwin rev.
F4

ed. 1952).

38 See United States v. Raucher, 119 U.S. 407
(1886).

It happens that the respondent seeking
herein the protection of the right to the
exercise of religious freedom contained in
the ante-nuptial contract is a Catholic. But
the principle invoked operates to bulwark
the right to the exercise of religious freedom
of persons of all religions, for its applica75
tion extends to all.
75 Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100, 112 (Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1942).

